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THIS ARTICLE DETAILS advanced methods for the han-
dling of airline passenger injury claims. It is based on the
rather prosaic idea that the aerial environment is quite different
from the earthbound milieu in certain key respects, alongside
the less prosaic-and claim-related-notion that these differ-
ences give rise to opportunities for evaluating injury claims
under a set of standards that respond directly to the posited dif-
ferences. This means, among other things, that where the spe-
cial circumstances of the flight environment have the capability
to reshape the air carrier liability regime, the claims operative
and her counsel are advised to take notice. It will be argued, in
fact, that the viability of certain airline injury claims is so sensi-
tive to either the location of the happening of the injury (in
flight) or the instrumentality alleged to have caused it (an air-
plane) that opportunities abound for the avoidance of liability
whereas in other regimes it might be accepted. The factors that
will be advanced undergirding this claim include: (1) certain
specific aspects of the physics of flight, to be discussed; (2) se-
lected design characteristics of passenger aircraft and their mul-
tifarious systems; and (3) a variety of federal statutes and
regulations designed to govern air carrier safety and commerce.
As an initial concession, the argument could be entertained
that the aerial environment acts to create a heightened risk of
injury to cabin occupants because airliner cabins and boarding
means are often cramped and unfamiliar (leading to accidents
* R.D. Truitt, J.D., M.A., worked as a claims attorney for an aerospace insurer.
Prior to entering the legal and insurance fields, he served as a U.S. Air Force
combat pilot, a major airline captain, an aviation testifying expert, and as a
television network air-crash commentator. He has published on aerodynamics,
international affairs, and aviation torts and now consults on aviation legal-
technical matters.
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of inattentiveness or inability to navigate them), and because air-
liner cabins mainly operate in a regime of low atmospheric pres-
sure and occasional rough air. Countervailing this argument is
the notion that as the risk of injury increases, passengers' ability
to impose liability on the carrier decreases in roughly equal
measure-the reasons for which will be explicated.
II. AVIATION FACTS-NOT SO FAST
A rightful question at this juncture would be: How does it
come about that an airline injury with a factual setting that, for
all appearances, shows palpable airline negligence can neverthe-
less fail to rise to the level of an actionable breach of a legal
duty? The key to unwinding this conundrum lies in the fact that
many air carrier injury claims are based on misperceiving avia-
tion "facts," which, when properly unwound and dissected, can
show a path to either effective denials or, in the event of litiga-
tion, availing defenses. One explanation for this misperception
is the operation of the logical fallacy of faulty analogizing, where
it might be believed, for example, that the way physical
processes work aloft are the same as on earth, which is not al-
ways true. To illustrate, it could be believed that a change in
cabin pressure causing ear pain should not occur while airborne
because pressures do not change in cars-a misapprehension
which could spur claims against the airline. While claims of this
nature are capable of being dispatched with an explanation that
pressure changes are normal in airliners and that flying with a
cold or upper respiratory infection is the likely cause of difficul-
ties or pain, how does one respond to a case of actual proven,
pressure-related injury? The response is the same-the airline
cannot, in the normal course, be held liable for even docu-
mented pressure-related injury.
Before delving into the dense milieu of aviation verities that
occasionally trip up our claimants, we dispose of a couple of le-
gal intricacies that, however tangential to the topic at hand, nev-
ertheless would be of more than passing interest to the air
carrier claims operative. The first is the occasionally encoun-
tered, but eminently erroneous, notion that getting hurt on an
airliner willy-nilly entitles one to compensation, as though air-
line activities were subject to a rule of strict liability-liability
without fault-which is not the case.1 Even further afield is the
I An exception to this strict liability dictum is injury occurring in international
flight under the Montreal Convention, where strict liability for injury is imposed
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claim sounding in "insurer liability"-liability with neither fault
nor causation-which is also not the case.2 And, despite the oft-
heard maxim that air carrier liability is founded on the common
law legal duty to passengers of "utmost care," this stricture does
not obviate the usual and ordinary negligence analysis consist-
ing of exposition of a legal duty owed, heightened or not; evi-
dence of breach; the carrier's act or omission fairly charged as
causative of the harm sustained; and damages.
Another interesting set of airline claims are those for injuries
occurring in airport terminals. Although these claims are not
airline claims in the sense of one's being on or near an airplane,
their ability to fascinate is unending. First, their number and
variety cast the impression that the terminal environment causes
many to lose all sense of their relation to their surroundings and
to each other. This hypothesized diminished perceptual acuity
does not start on the airplane but upon first entrance to the
terminal, where customers begin slipping on floors, tripping on
rugs, knocking each other over, toppling on moving walkways,
falling on escalators, tumbling injetways, and occasionally trying
to walk without a wheelchair (when they know they cannot) and
falling in the process-and then looking around to see who can
pay.4 Crowded terminal buildings with daunting reception halls
and confusing signage could combine to adversely affect both
attentiveness and sure-footedness. Add to this the anxieties at-
tendant to arriving at one's gate at the allotted hour in combina-
tion with the prospect of partially disrobing and walking
through machines, and it can be seen how one's distraction quo-
tient could rise. Fortunately, the quotidian terminal slip-and-fall
case is subject to ready disposal by reference to classic negli-
for an Article 17 "accident" aboard the aircraft. Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air art 17, May 28, 1999, 2242
U.N.T.S. 309, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45 [hereinafter Montreal Convention]. The
accident requirement is to insure that something external to the passenger had
to have caused the claimed injury. Id. The Montreal Convention superseded the
old Warsaw Convention of 1929 which had somewhat different liability rules. Id.
2 So-called insurer liability is imposed by a contract for insurance for proved,
covered injury, not for injury liability sought to be proved-a distinction with a
difference. See Allen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 370, 374 (E.D. Pa.
2003).
3 Id.
4 See, e.g., Ketterina v. Am. Bldg. Maintenance Co. of Oakland, 426 P.2d 974
(Colo. 1967). This curious brew of literal airline customer faux pas is chronicled
in airline lore by the tongue-in-cheek aphorism that airline customers "check
their brains at the door."
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gence principles, with no particularized aviation knowledge
required. 5
Not so in the case of the highly-specialized environment of an
airline cabin-a tube of aluminum or carbon' hurtling through
the sky at breakneck speed (if you will allow it) controlled by
unseen people using mysterious means. It would not be too
much exaggeration to say that the lay mental model (how the
unversed think about a topic rightly or wrongly) of air travel is
that it is a mysterious process powered by unexplained forces
done in an uncongenial environment. Some of us add the pro-
viso that as long as we can see the ground, the plane is being
held up, and if we cannot, there is no telling. A major variable
accounting for much passenger apprehension-airplane
height-also happens to be a chief factor responsible for the
postulated enhanced risk of commercial air travel, as well as for
the specialized associated defenses that will be discussed.
One salient feature of the "height variable" is the thinning of
the air with increasing altitude. Although this rarifying effect is
compensated for by airplane pressurization systems, this pres-
sure component accounts for a substantial portion of claims.7
Another important feature of increasing altitude is the greater
odds for encountering injurious turbulence, which in itself con-
stitutes fertile ground for the aforesaid faulty analogizing.' An
example would be a proclivity to compare a turbulence encoun-
ter with riding in a carelessly driven car crashing through
potholes; injured airline passengers might conclude that the pi-
lots are as liable as the errant car driver. This conclusion would
be mistaken in the usual case, however, because of material dif-
ferences in the ability of respective operators to perceive, and
thus to avoid, the hazard. This rough and ready comparison
constitutes a first illustration of how the accustomed mental
models of daily life do not translate dependably to the aerial
environment. It is possible, even likely, that the pilots were not
negligent-due not only to postulated perceptual limitations
but also to other factors that can act to relieve the pilots and the
airline of liability for turbulence injury.
See MacDonald v. Air Can., 439 F.2d 1402, 1404-05 (1st Cir. 1971).
6 If the new B-787 Dreamliner is a harbinger, carbon filament is poised to be
the dominant hull-construction material of the future. SeeJustin Hale, Boeing 787
From the Ground Up, AERO 4.06, 18, available at http://www.boeing.com/commer-
cial/aeromagazine/articles/qtr_4 06/article_043.html.
7 See generally Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Marchant, 249 F.2d 612 (1st Cir. 1957).
s See generally Barber v. United Airlines, 17 F. App'x 433 (7th Cir. 2001).
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III. UPS AND DOWNS OF MID-AIR TURBULENCE
The first thing to know about mid-air turbulence is that it is
not foreordained to cause injury as long as one's body is se-
curely affixed to the airplane by the seatbelt worn-in the usual
airline parlance-"low and tight" across the lap.9 The customary
public address announcements directed to the cabin are de-
signed to reinforce this idea. Nevertheless, passengers ignore
the seatbelt sign when it is illuminated and the various an-
nouncements when it is not, and they become injured.'l A first
line of inquiry may thus suggest itself, i.e., whether the sign was
indeed illuminated and whether, in addition, crewmembers had
issued the usual verbal admonitions. 1 While an illuminated
seatbelt sign qualifies as a complete defense, evidence of deliv-
ery of the usual safety announcements adds a convincing patina
to a claim denial. 12
Even where the seatbelt sign had been released and passen-
gers were away from their seats, claims of injury are still capable
of being denied, particularly in the case of a clear air turbulence
(CAT) encounter." As suggested in the name, CAT cannot be
detected by eye, nor can CAT be made to appear on the cockpit
weather radar screen.' 4 Other than "strategic notice" provided
by the pilots' preflight weather forecast indicating the possibility
of CAT along the intended route of flight-which can be unreli-
able due to the passage of time and shifting weather patterns-
the principal source of good CAT warnings consist of the "tacti-
cal warning" provided by the reports of other aircraft operating
in the vicinity, along with the secondary reports of air traffic
control (ATC).15 In the absence of either kind of notice, espe-
cially the latter kind, airline policy is typically to allow relatively
unfettered movement in the cabin (i.e., with the seatbelt sign
9 See generally Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 371-72 (3d Cir.
1999); Magan v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 339 F.3d 158, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2003).
10 See Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 371-72.
11 Id. at 365.
12 See 14 C.F.R § 121.317(b) (2015) (requiring the "Fasten Seat Belt" sign be
turned on when "considered necessary by the pilot in command."). See also 14
C.F.R. § 121.317(f) (requiring each passenger to "fasten his or her safety belt"
and "keep it fastened while the 'Fasten Seat Belt' sign is lighted."); Allen v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 370, 375 (E.D. Pa. 2003); FAA Order 8900.1, vol. 3,
ch. 33, § 6, 3-3561 (B) (Jan. 30, 2014) (stating, "When the seatbelt sign is turned
on, crewmembers should make an announcement.").
13 See Barber, 17 F. App'x at 435.
14 Id. at 436.
15 Id.
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released), and as long as the usual seatbelt-safety announcement
protocols are followed, there can be no liability for turbulence
injury. 16 Legal cases confirming the rightness of this "no-pay"
stance for airborne turbulence injury include the defense ver-
dicts rendered in Barber v. United Airlines,17 Karuba v. Delta Air
Lines,i" and Point-Du-Jour v. American Airlines.'9
The "no-tactical-warning" defense in a CAT encounter-espe-
cially in combination with other exculpating factors-will be dis-
positive.2" However, a good "belt and suspenders" approach
would be to learn of any mitigating crew actions, such as
whether pilots requested from ATC a different altitude in search
of smoother air and/or adjusted speed to best turbulence pene-
tration speed in order to smooth out the ride.' Whether or not
the altitude-change request was granted is of less moment than
whether the request was made-which increases odds that an
injurious CAT encounter would receive a characterization of
force majeure, or Act of God (as opposed to actionable airline
negligence).2 2 The following actual denial delivered to a claim-
ant's attorney reflects this approach (the claim having been
abandoned):
Turbulence is expected and normal. To experience turbu-
lence-even to sustain injury-is not necessarily probative of
negligence absent evidence of crew misconduct, of which none
appears in this case. The crew was unwarned, and they slowed to
turbulence penetration airspeed the moment they encountered
turbulence. They discussed diverting, but they were already in
the turbulence and in their judgment, the flight could be com-
pleted safely to the destination.
Turbulence injury claims are also deniable on the ground
that the turbulence was of insufficient intensity to cause injury. 23
16 Id. at 438. The customer ease object becomes more compelling in light of
the risks of long-period seating, in particular, the deep vein thrombosis (DVT)
risk. See Deep Vein Thrombosis and Pulmonary Embolism, CDC, Mar. 2, 2015, available
at wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/page/dvt. This peril is minimized to the extent the air-
line creates opportunities for passengers to leave their seats, and passengers avail
themselves of the opportunities. Id.
17 Barber, F. App'x at 435.
18 No. 87 Cir. 1455, 1991 WL 51093, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1991).
19 No. 07-CV-3371, 2009 WL 3756627, at *5, *9 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2009).
20 Barber, 17 F. App'x at 436, 441.
21 But see Small v. Transcon. & W. Air, 216 P.2d 36, 37 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1950).
22 See id.
23 Magan v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 339 F.3d 158, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2003).
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The following is an actual denial based on the fact that "very
light" turbulence-a classification that is recognized by the FAA
and by some courts-could not have caused claimant's fall and
injury (this claim also being abandoned): "Our reports indicate
that the particular flight from ["X" to "Y"] experienced no
greater than "very light" turbulence, a condition insufficient to
unbalance a person with normal vestibular and proprioceptive
faculties; thus, your client's fall was due to his own negligence
and/or preexisting condition(s)."
This denial highlights a passenger's own duty to avoid harm.
In fact, a passenger's lack of care by ignoring rough conditions
should, depending on the facts, intervene and supersede any
fault that might be attributable to the airline, a guideline
broadly hinted at by the following jury charge in Eastern Airlines
v. Silber "A passenger on a common carrier is required to exer-
cise reasonable care for his or her own safety and is chargeable
with knowledge of conditions which his or her senses record. 24
This maxim, reflective of both common sense and the common
law of most, if not all, jurisdictions should inform any turbu-
lence-injury analysis.
When and if litigation ensues, resort can always be had to cer-
tain legal defenses-prominent among them specialized federal
statutes addressing airline safety and air commerce. Burnishing
their prominence is the fact that these statutes have the distinc-
tion of being preemptive of state tort law and state rules, thus
curtailing much airline injury litigation at its inception. 25 A pro-
genitor Third Circuit case, Abdullah v. American Airlines, declared
that the Federal Aviation Act (FAA) of 1958 occupied the field
for regulating airline safety, thus precluding private enforce-
ment of, or resort to, standards of care contained in state safety
rules or laws. 26 Therefore, having been preempted by operation
of federal rules, state tort law is incapable of being brought to
bear, and state suits are stopped unless a violation of an FAA
safety rule can be successfully pleaded.27 The main FAA safety
24 E. Airlines v. Silber, 324 F.2d 38, 39 (5th Cir. 1963).The jury charge was
quoted by the Court of Appeals in its decision affirming a verdict and judgment
against the airline for negligence in not using the weather radar for storm avoid-
ance. Id.
25 Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999).
26 Id. But cf. Vinnick v. Delta Airlines, 93 Cal. App. 4th 859, 861, 864 (2001)
(holding that the FAA does not preempt operation of California tort laws when
the issue is injury produced by falling objects.).
27 Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 367. But see Vinnick, 93 Cal. App. 4th at 864.
2015] PLANE CLAIMS 455
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
provision for which a violation must be shown is the FAA's regu-
latory proscription against "careless or reckless operation" of air-
craft (unless a more specific safety rule could be found to be on
point) .28
Abdullah substantially raised the bar in the Third Circuit and
other jurisdictions following it-which is probably most, if not
all, of them to one degree or another-for turbulence-injury
plaintiffs to establish airline negligence.29 The closest factual set
suggestive of a violation would be where conspicuously bad crew
error created abnormal and unexpected risks to the aircraft, its
passengers, or to persons on the ground-conduct which is so
difficult to prove in the normal course as to all but preclude a
viable "careless and reckless" claim. 0
For example, the court in Allen v. American Airlines (a failure
to warn case) concluded, after surveying a number of prior cases
alleging a careless or reckless violation, that the conduct com-
plained of was "far more extreme and carried far graver conse-
quences than Defendant's challenged conduct here," adding
that careless and reckless therefore had to be "reserved only for
egregious crew misconduct where the potential for harm is in-
contestably high," as where "a pilot flew into known or forecast
severe icing conditions. -3 1 As convincing as Allen might seem
concerning the low odds for a successful end-run around a pre-
emption defense, the law could be more nuanced elsewhere, ne-
cessitating testing one's facts against the current law of the
controlling circuit.12 The following sections will explore some
common aviation litigation factual situations where a so-called
"expert-informed" analysis can point to a path for liability
avoidance.
IV. CABIN ENVIRONMENTALS-NO PRESSURE
"Cabin environmentals"-a term of art denoting the artificial
conditions of temperature, pressure, and humidity extant in an
airplane cabin designed to make airliner flight not only endura-
28 14 C.F.R. 91.13 (2015). The "careless and reckless" rule is codified at 14
C.F.R. 91.13 in the set of rules known as the Federal Aviation Regulations
(FARS). The Abdullah court did say that in the event that the jury found an actual
violation of the rule, ajury could impose state damage remedies. See Abdullah, 181
F.3d at 376.
29 Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 376.
30 Allen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 370, 376 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
31 Id.
32 Id. at 376-77.
456
PLANE CLAIMS
ble but comfortable-is frequently advanced as a cause of action
for alleged airborne injury.3" This claim type occurs at the inter-
section of physics and physiology-the physics of high altitude
flight in tandem with the physiology of the human middle ear
and sinuses. These cranial regions consist of air-filled voids
whose normally open passageways to the outside world could be
narrowed, or even closed off in extreme cases, due either to in-
flammation from a cold or by a congenital malformation, thus
interfering with, and even preventing, normal pressure equaliza-
tion during changes in cabin pressure.34 Pain can result, and in
the extreme case, actual injury in the form of distension of tis-
sues and infusion of blood into the voids.3 5 "Barotrauma" is the
name given to this malady and is used here as shorthand for
having sustained either pain or injury, because either symptoma-
tology could theoretically support a claim. 6 As a practical mat-
ter, it will be the rare claim that can establish airline
responsibility for barotrauma due to the necessary confluence of
two factors-an unusual congenital malformation predisposing
a sufferer to either of two types of pressure change and a proved
aircraft malfunction.
To preface discussion of specific barotrauma claims and de-
fenses, we briefly allude, because of its importance to the topic,
to the seminal U.S. barotrauma legal case, Air France v. Saks,
which was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1985.7 Saks
was a Warsaw Convention case for international flights that im-
posed on the Court the necessity of deciding whether a Warsaw
"accident" had occurred in order to find liability.38 In finding no
33 See Cabin Environmental Control Systems, FAA 16-23, available at http://www.faa
.gov/regulations-policies/handbooks manuals/aircraft/amtairframehand
book/media/amachl6.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Cabin
Environmental].
34 See Dougal Watson, The Effect of Ascent and Descent on Gas Collections Within the
Body, PILOTFRIEND, http://www.pilotfriend.com/aeromed/medical/ascent-de
scent.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
35 Id.
36 See generally Eric Hexdall, Barotrauma: The Ins and Outs of the Pops and Cracks,
DIVEASSURE, https://www.diveassure.com/new/documents/Barotrauma-_The_
InsandOuts of thePops-and_Cracks,_EricHexdall,_RN,CHRN,_Duke_
DiveMedicine.pdf (last visited March 2, 2015). Complications could possibly in-
clude bleeding, ruptured or perforated eardrum(s), hearing loss, and infection.
See also Cabin Environmental, supra note 33, at fig. 1.
37 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 394 (1985).
38 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the Warsaw Convention
of 1929 and its replacement, the Montreal Convention of 1999); see also Saks, 470
U.S. at 394.
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accident within the meaning of the treaty and no evidence of an
airplane malfunction, the Court concluded that claimant's own
"internal reaction" to the normal and expected cabin pressure
changes caused her symptoms, and the airline was not liable. 9
The Saks takeaway is, of course, that a claimant's own personal
reaction to an airplane's normal operation does not qualify for
compensation, and this rule, indeed, reflects the law for domes-
tic as well as international air travel.40
It may be justly asked: How may a claimant attempt to estab-
lish "abnormal operation" of an aircraft's pressurization system
so as to advance her barotrauma claim? Such a claim might be
credibly made were it not for an inconvenient pack of truths:
first, that barotrauma can only result-except in a very rare in-
stance, which will be covered-from an increase in cabin pres-
sure, as occurs while the cabin is descending for landing; and
second, that a truly malfunctioning cabin pressurization system
will only produce a decrease in cabin pressure, which mimics a
condition of ascending to higher altitude and consequently,
lower pressure.4 Since barotrauma symptoms are normally coin-
cident with descent and an airplane pressurization failure
mimics ascent, it follows that barotrauma cannot be associated
with an alleged-or even proved-airplane pressurization
fault.4 2 Accordingly, barotrauma claims are deniable in the nor-
mal course.43
The exact mechanism of barotrauma is as follows: as the air-
craft ascends into thinner air, the internal voids release air pres-
sure to the lower pressure cabin environment, and then as air
attempts to push its way in on descent, the restricted, or closed
off, passageways of a cold or malformation sufferer prevent
timely equalization of internal pressures, producing middle ear
39 Saks, 470 U.S. at 406.
40 Id.
41 Watson, supra note 34.
42 Id.
43 The rarity of barotrauma occurring on ascent is confirmed in the author's
March 13, 2013 personal interview with a senior U.S. Air Force flight surgeon
who was speaking at an aeromedical conference at the Ramstein Air Base in Ger-
many. The interviewee emphasized that the barotrauma-on-ascent condition,
known in the field as "reverse block" or "reverse squeeze," was rarely seen and is a
result of an unusual formation of the Eustachian Tubes or sinuses, in other
words-of idiosyncratic origin. A video precis of the conference may be seen at
the U.S. European Command website. Sgt. Abigail Waldrop, Ramstein Air Base




or frontal sinus pain, and sometimes injury." Please think of a
balloon with a lightly pinched neck that permits some air to es-
cape, but air re-enters only with force. Given this physiological
fact, it is clear why human barotrauma can only be normally as-
sociated with descent into higher-pressure air; this fact also hap-
pens to constitute one-half the explanation why the airline
normally has no liability for barotrauma injury. The other half
of the explanation is the previously mentioned fact that an air-
plane pressurization malfunction only produces a decrease in
air pressure, which is inconsistent with descent where cabin
pressure is increasing.
The reason that an airplane pressurization fault always results
in decreased pressure is that the fault always takes the form of a
breakage or breach wherein the pressurizing agent (air) escapes
through a cabin breach or through a valve leak or an air duct, or
possibly fails to be produced due to a fault in the airplane air
pressurizing systems or by an electronic fault.45 What is impor-
tant to remember upon receiving a claim sounding in baro-
trauma is to attempt to learn when symptoms were first
experienced; if an admission is forthcoming or can be elicited
that the complained-of symptoms were encountered on descent
or 'Just before landing," this is claimant's testimony that a nor-
mal aircraft repressurization was taking place.4 6 Accordingly, the
claim is deniable as evidencing no aircraft fault.47
The foregoing should cause one to think that the odds are
stacked against a plaintiff succeeding in a claim against an air-
line for barotrauma during descent-and that would be a mis-
taken conclusion. A cautionary tale is told by the case of a
Louisiana woman with a congenital ear defect predisposing her
to pressurization injury who successfully sued Northwest Airlines
44 Watson, supra note 34.
45 If the circuit breakers protecting pressurization system electronics trip and
will not restore, pressurization will be lost. This fault could be recognized as a
failure to pressurize during initial climbout-a condition readily detected by
sensing a lack of conditioned air during the early stages of the climb-and could
be compensated for by an immediate descent for either troubleshooting or land-
ing, which the author has done. Alternatively, if a circuit trips at altitude-an
extreme rarity-this is readily handled by a fast descent to a lower altitude, which
the author has also done (with no barotrauma complaints). Ryanair Emergency:
How Losing Cabin Pressure Can Prove Fatal, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 26, 2008, 11:02 AM),
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/2624658/Ryanair-emergency-
How-losing-cabin-pressure-can-provefatal.html.
46 Watson, supra note 34.
47 This assumes that investigation reveals no crew-reported pressurization
problems.
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in a Minnesota court for alleged barotrauma on a DC-9 flight.48
Evidence of an airplane pressurization problem on the particu-
lar flight was suspect and not corroborated by any other evi-
dence from the flight, including pilot or cabin crew reports.49
Nevertheless, plaintiff succeeded (mainly, if not exclusively,
through adroit lawyering!) in engendering sufficientjury sympa-
thy for an award.5 °
V. TWO EXCEPTIONS-AND A PSEUDO-EXCEPTION
Forming a minor exception to the general rule of no baro-
trauma symptoms on ascent would be a case of tooth pain
known as barodontalgia (or aerodontalgia). This malady results
from either a pathology of the tooth or possibly a recent tooth
surgery where an internal lesion or inflammation prevents
equalization of internal pressure with the decreasing ambient
pressure of climb.51 Therefore, if the cabin were to fail to prop-
erly pressurize on ascent, it would follow that such a malfunc-
tion could factor in producing a barodontalgia episode, and
such a claim would be compensable-but only with a proved air-
craft pressurization malfunction. 2
The second possible exception would be actual cabin decom-
pression, the seriousness of which depends primarily on these
factors: (1) the rate of onset of the decompression-gradual,
explosive, or something in between;53 (2) the duration of the
low pressure event, which is a function of both aircraft height at
the time of the occurrence and the rapidity of the descent initi-
48 See Ahneman v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., No. PI 03-005060, 2004 WL 2480830
(Minn. Dist. Ct. June 24, 2004).
49 Hearing-Damage Lawsuit Sounds Like Bad News for Northwest, USA TODAY (June
30, 2004, 1:35 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2004-06-30-nwa-law-
suitx.htm?csp=28. No other complaints were received from this flight. The au-
thor was in attendance at the trial.
50 Id.
51 See Roland Robichaud & Mary E. McNally, Barodontalgia as a Differential Diag-
nosis: Symptoms and Findings, CLINICAL PRAc.,Jan. 2005, at 39 (providing a medical
description), http://www.cda-adc.ca/jcda/vol-71/issue-1/39.pdf.
52 See generally id. Assuming a proved airplane defect, the value of such a claim
would be minimal because the tooth pain is not especially severe and abates com-
pletely upon descent for landing as the cabin repressurizes, in the author's expe-
rience on two separate occasions.
53 See Cabin Decompression Awareness, AIRBUS (Apr. 2007), available at http://
www.airbus.com/fileadmin/mediagallery/files/safety_library_items/Airbus-
SafetyLibFLTOPS-CABOPS-SEQ09.pdf; Uncontrolled Decompression, WiKiPEDIA,




ated by the pilots; 54 and finally (3) the extent to which cabin
occupants avail themselves of the provided supplemental oxy-
gen.55 Fortunately, due to the fitting of redundant electronic
pressure controllers to commercial aircraft in recent decades,
the incidence of cabin decompressions has been in steady de-
cline so as to constitute a very rare occurrence. 56 Rarer still
would be the so-called "explosive decompression," i.e., that
caused by a metal fatigue or structural failure producing a pres-
sure vessel breach. 57 Liability would be presumed for any type of
high altitude sickness contracted as a result of a true decompres-
sion-especially when supported by evidence of treatment and
an appropriate diagnosis. 58
The "pseudo-exception" to the rule of no airline liability for
pressurization anomalies would be a claim that the steep gradi-
ent of rapid airplane descent was replicated in the cabin so that
cabin occupants were exposed to an abnormally high rate of
repressurization in the cabin.59 While it is true that a severe
cabin repressurizing gradient could stress the middle ear's abil-
ity to "keep up"-with barotrauma a possible consequence-the
fallacy contained in this claim is in assuming that the cabin de-
scended at the same rate as the aircraft, which is almost never
the case.6" The cabin electronic pressurization controller modu-
lates the cabin descent rate to a comfortable 300 to 400 feet-per-
minute from cruise altitude to landing regardless of the actual
54 See Cabin Decompression Awareness, supra note 53.
55 Id. A true cabin decompression, depending on severity and duration, could
cause various high altitude maladies including hypoxia, loss of consciousness, de-
compression sickness (aka "the bends"), injurious gas expansion, brain damage,
and death. Id. The latter has occurred where no descent was accomplished, or
oxygen was not available or was not used. Professional golfer Payne Stewart's
Learjet crashed in 1999 for these reasons, killing all aboard. See 1999 South Dakota
Learjet Crash, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_SouthDakotaLear
jet-crash (last modified Jan. 29, 2015); see also Helios Airways Right 522, WIKIPEDtA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HeliosAirways-Flight522 (last modified Jan. 28,
2015).
56 Cabin Environmental, supra note 33, at 16-29.
57 Id.
58 A claim for fright or loss of consciousness may also be considered for com-
pensation depending on whether the covering policy could be fairly interpreted
not to exclude these two ascriptive categories and depending also on the genu-
ineness of the claim, to the extent determinable.
59 See Practical Application of Pressurization Systems, OU, http://www.aviation.ou
.edu/student/documents/PracticalApplicationofPressurizationsystems.pdf (last
visited Feb. 18, 2015).
60 Id.
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rate achieved by the airplane, as detailed in the following denial
(the claim having been abandoned):
You may have misconstrued the crew's declaration of an airborne
emergency, and the plane's steep descent, as affecting the rate of
cabin pressure change. This is a misapprehension. At 31,000 feet
(your cruise altitude), the altitude inside the cabin was automati-
cally set to 5000 feet, meaning that in the minimum achievable
descent time of 11 to 12 minutes to the Birmingham airport ele-
vation, the cabin descended at a rate of about 400 feet per min-
ute-which is comfortable and normal.
VI. THE ENGINE NOISES ARE IN MY HEAD
What to know about jet engines is that they need to make
noise to make power. Even where it can be shown that an en-
gine was making "unusually loud" noises, this showing does not
support a claim for compensation where (1) no other person
complained; (2) crewmembers' statements affirmed that the
sounds were not overly loud; and (3) the complainant refused
offers to change seats to move away from the offending noise-
as reflected in this actual denial (the claim being abandoned):
We understand that the engine sounds where your client was
seated constituted an annoyance, but we are constrained to note
that jet engines have to make noise, that there were no other
complaints, that crewmember statements support the conclusion
that the engine sounds were not excessively loud, and that your
client refused to move when offered the opportunity. Only 54 of
the 109 seats on the aircraft were occupied-many if not most of
which were a considerable distance from the aft cabin where
your client was seated.
Claimant's counsel persisted with a doctor's note, receiving this
reply:
While we agree that jet engine high frequency noises can pose a
threat to hearing, the exposure must occur over long periods
and that the exposure must be unattenuated-that is, outside the
aircraft in the vicinity of the engine and without hearing protec-
tion. The interior of a civil transport is outfitted with sound at-
tenuation materials specifically designed to protect against high
frequency jet sounds; thus, the settled learning is that there is no
danger of high frequency hearing injury while seated in the
cabin. We do not dispute that, in this case, any louder-than-nor-




It should also be noted in this context that many, if not most,
aviation policies do contain a noise exclusion; however, the ex-
clusion is ordinarily written to apply outside the aircraft.61
Therefore, in a proper case, noises heard inside a cabin would
be covered, assuming that the airline had done something
wrong such as leaving either an overwing hatch or rear cabin
door open in the vicinity of a running engine (both constituting
serious protocol violations).
VII. TAKEOFFS ARE OPTIONAL-
LANDINGS MANDATORY
What to know about landings is that, within certain limits-
not unlike turbulence encounters-hard landings are a part of
aviation. Gusty winds or wake vortices lingering close to the sur-
face can throw off the most carefully planned approach to the
runway, leading occasionally to a hard landing.6 2 The second
thing to know is that airplanes are not as strong as people-
meaning that if a hard landing did not hurt the airplane, it
would not have been capable of harming occupants.6 3 It follows
that if there are no logbook entries concerning a hard landing,
no post-landing airworthiness inspection issues, or no other
complaints, then injury claims from even a "horrible" landing
can be safely denied,64 as in this communication to a claimant:
"We do not take issue with the very real possibility that the plane
experienced hard landing that day, but this sort of thing hap-
pens in aviation, and it can be said that this is a part of flying.
61 John Kelly, Flight to Quality, AVIATION INS., http://www.aviationi.com/arti-
cle11N.htm (last updated Oct. 1, 2003).
62 Wake vortices are high velocity swirls of air coming off the wings of landing
aircraft. Pilot and Air Traffic Controller Guide to Wake Turbulence, FAA, 2.20, https://
www.faa.gov/training-testing/training/media/wake/04SEC2.pdf (last visited
Feb. 16, 2015). Their effects are minimized by FAA-mandated minimum spacing
between aircraft in the landing sequence, which delay is designed to allow the
vortices to dissipate. Id.
63 Aircraft landing gear and tires are designed to absorb landing loads to keep
impact forces from reaching the cabin in an injurious fashion, minimizing the
effect of "bad" landings. For a technical discussion, see Chapter 13-Aircraft Land-
ing Gear Systems, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/regulations-policies/handbooksman
uals/aircraft/amt airframehandbook/media/amaChl3.pdf (last visited Feb.
16, 2015).
64 A logbook "hard landing" entry is mandatory and will cause a thorough in-
spection of the airplane before it is returned to service. See, e.g., Recommended
Inspection Procedures for Former Military Aircraft, FAA, Advisory Circular No. 43-209A
(2013).
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Pilots strive for smooth landings, but winds can be
unpredictable."
Complaints are sometimes received alleging that a precipitous
stop on landing threw the claimant into the coach seats in front
of her causing injury. Hard stopping forces as a result of aggres-
sive wheel braking and/or thrust reversing can unsettle the in-
experienced air traveler, but this is different from injury. When
pilots select stopping forces for a given landing, the electronic
anti-skid system will determine the total deceleration forces sup-
plied by the brakes and engine thrust reversers to ensure little, if
any, disturbance to cabin occupants.65 Pilots may also exercise
the option of employing automatic wheel braking, with the set-
tings carefully designed to achieve safe, non-injurious stops, as
detailed in this denial: "The captain has indicated to us that he
selected Autobrakes II, which is an 'average' setting for landing
on wet runways. This setting provides slightly more deceleration
than what is normally experienced, but it is not expected to
cause alarm or injury."
VIII. AND IF THEY DON'T BUY IT?
What if, through staunch adherence to basic negligence prin-
ciples informed by the technical precepts discussed here, you
have properly denied an airline injury claim, and then the
claimant retains counsel in order to more vigorously press his
claim? As previously noted, the statute books can step into the
breach to make available defenses that will typically reach a re-
sult equivalent to a properly founded denial. A first arrow in the
statutory quiver is the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA)-
whose aim was to lower prices by increasing airline competi-
tion.66 Lawmakers believed the competition goal could be best
served by freeing airlines' "price, route [s], [and] service '67 poli-
cies and behaviors from the erstwhile control of state laws and
rules-the mechanism achieving this result consisting of federal
preemption of the state-based claims.
ADA preemption has achieved a formidable record of success
in the so-called customer contact areas consisting of the ticket-
ing, boarding, and seating phases. It is here that customer disap-
65 Mario M. Neto & Luiz Carlos S. Goes, A Review of Aircraft Antiskid System and
Hydraulics Application for Brake System, CISB, at 18, http://cisb.org.br/wiefp2014/
presentations/Session%206_Mario%2OMaia.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
66 Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 et seq. (1978).




pointment over a slight or an injury, real or imagined, can
morph into a claim and ultimately, a lawsuit. The types of law-
suits falling to ADA preemption have included allegations of tor-
tious ejectment, denied or delayed boarding, faulty boarding
policy and/or priorities, tortious enforcement of "bumping"
policy, and injury emanating from dense seating or lack of
legroom. Testimony to the robustness of this legal defense is
found in these collected preemption cases: Roberts v. American
Airlines, Inc.6" (boarding/bumping policy); Delta Airlines, Inc. v.
Black69 (ticketing, seating); Letty v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (in-
jury from lack of legroom); Nali v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.71 (flight
delay); and Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.72 (cramped legroom-
ADA preemption; lack of warning of the risk of deep vein
thrombosis-FAA preemption). The doctrine of "state equitable
abstention" has operated to achieve equivalent results, as in Tall
Club of Silicon Valley v. Alaska Airlines73 (inadequate leg room). In
summary, to the extent that the alleged injury can be fairly as-
sessed as an artifact of airline enforcement of a not unreasona-
ble policy relating to the provision of a service within the
statute's contemplation (the "price" and "routes" components
not having figured prominently in the cases), ADA preemption
has proven a stout and reliable defense.74 That being the case,
there need be no hesitation in denying a ticketing, boarding, or
seating claim where liability is unequivocally absent.
A cautionary note is injected by cases not exhibiting a close
enough nexus between the airline conduct complained of and
an airline policy relating to the provision of a service. For exam-
ple, in Gill v. JetBlue Airways Corp., the airline dropped a disabled
passenger out of his chair, an act which was adjudged simple
68 1:02-CV-03620, 2003 WL 26128396, 29 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14,
2003).
69 116 S.W.3d 745, 747 (Tex. 2003).
70 864 So. 2d 413 (Table) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2003) (unpublished).
71 No. 240421, 2003 WL 22162315, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2003)
(unpublished).
72 366 F.3d 380, 386 (5th Cir. 2004).
73 No. A102863, 2004 WL 363529, at *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2004)
(unpublished).
74 Preemption ultimately depends on the law of the federal circuit which will
govern. While all circuits have upheld ADA preemption, they have interpreted
the closeness of the required nexus differently, leading to differing results on
similar facts. Where preemption fails, the matter will be determined on the mer-
its. See generally Christopher R. Christensen et al., Courts Interpret the Meaning of
"State Law" Under the Airline Deregulation Act, CONDON FORSVTH (Jan. 10, 2014),
available at http://www.condonlaw.com/2014/01/erika-maurice/.
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negligence with too tenuous a relation to enforcement of any
service policy, and preemption failed.75 The point cannot be
overstressed, therefore, that even though ADA preemption
forms the ultimate legal bulwark against alleged torts occurring
in the customer-contact arena, where the conduct complained
of appears more negligence than policy, preemption will not
rescue an improvident denial.
IX. OVERHEAD BINS-A HARD CASE
The overhead bin (OHB) fallen-object case, because of its
most salient feature-the inexorable question of the degree of
provable airline fault-comprises a claim category qualifying as
sui generis. A first line of inquiry in an OHB case would be the
extent of provable crewmember involvement in producing the
claimed injury. Where crewmember participation in an OHB in-
cident is in evidence (as in crew having touched the bin door or
its contents) in combination with proved injury, efficiency may
trump abstract justice by the expediency of a goodwill settle-
ment offer admitting no fault. A reason for this is that if the
claim goes to suit, the causation question devolves down to a
jury fact question, which can be dangerous for the reason that
juries tend to resolve difficult fact questions in favor of injured
plaintiffs. This proffered tack should govern a fortiori where ac-
tive crewmember involvement is shown-as in either supervising
the stowage of articles, helping to stow other articles, or touch-
ing the door of a bin from which articles fell-situations where a
jury could very easily mistake peripheral involvement for pri-
mary responsibility.
As to whether the hoary carrier duty of "utmost care" might
act to regulate cabin activities, a split of authority exists, the bet-
ter view being that this maxim applies to the operation of the
instrumentality that actually creates the additional risk sought to
be controlled-the aircraft-and not to routine passenger care
activities such as seating passengers and preparing the cabin for
departure. Winning OHB cases have examined the extent of the
crewmember duty owed, as in Allen v. Delta Airlines, Inc.76 and
the factual matter of breach of alleged crewmember duties, as in
75 Gill v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 836 F. Supp. 2d 33, 47 (D. Mass. Dec. 14,
2011).
76 No. CV-01-0069 (DGT), 2003 WL 21672746, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 3, 2003)
(holding there is no flight attendant duty to secure bin door during boarding).
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Lagleva v. Southwest Airlines,77 and Benton v. Southwest Airlines
Co. 7 8
The cases suggest that denial is appropriate where a good
showing of flight attendant participation in helping to produce
the alleged injury is lacking. This is especially true for a charge
of flight attendant failure to assist in article stowage or the clos-
ing of bin doors during boarding, where injury is reported.
These charges would in fact constitute a prime example of mis-
apprehending air carrier duties, for while flight attendants are
tasked with the safety-related duties of ensuring overhead bins
are properly packed and closed prior to aircraft movement,
flight attendants are not tasked to either touch or stow articles
although this courtesy is routinely extended.
In point of fact, higher priority cabin preparation and cabin
safety duties inevitably take precedence over any ascribed flight
attendant duty concerning article stowage. A main reason for
this is that each flight attendant can have as many as fifty passen-
gers to supervise and seat, a responsibility made more complex
by the short turnaround times extant in today's multi-leg sched-
ules."9 This prioritization principle should apply afortiori to the
charge that flight attendants neglected to prevent "other passen-
ger" incidents, as explained in this actual denial (the claim hav-
ing been abandoned): "While flight attendants do have duties
with respect to cabin management, they cannot be everywhere
at all times, and it is foreseeable that a passenger might acciden-
tally injure another while flight attendants are otherwise occu-
pied with higher priority duties."
Injury sustained on an international flight is subject to differ-
ent treatment in that Montreal (or Warsaw for pre-2004 cases)
analysis first consists of determining if an Article 17 accident oc-
curred so as to confer jurisdiction."0 To find a Montreal acci-
dent, we briefly revisit the Supreme Court "accident" rubric
from Saks as to whether (1) the incident consisted of an "unex-
pected or unusual event or happening that [was] external to the
passenger"; with (2) the happenstance not deriving from "the
passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and ex-
77 No. 00CV00528, 2002 WL 34396765, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2002) (un-
published) (defense verdict).
78 No. BC271335 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2003) (unpublished)
(defense verdict).
79 The 50 to 1 maximum ratio of passengers to flight attendants is contained in
the federal aviation regulations (FARs), codified at 14 C.F.R. § 121.391 (2015).
80 See, e.g., Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
2015] 467
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
pected operation of the aircraft."8' A leading case finding a
Montreal accident was Olympic Airways v. Husain, where crew in-
action to avert a medical emergency was held to be an acci-
dent." In its application to an OHB case, see Smith v. American
Airlines, Inc., where a falling object was held to be an accident.8 3
The takeaway for international flight is that where the facts re-
flect that the injury resulted from a surprise event external to
the claimant, it qualifies as an Article 17 accident, with the treaty
imposing strict liability.8 4 All that remains is to settle on
damages.
X. THE "SAFETY-NEXUS" CASES
Denying a claim on the basis of no airline negligence-think
of the "other-passenger," Act of God, or "no crewmember in-
volvement" type of denial-could spur a lawsuit charging a viola-
tion of the federal safety rule proscribing careless or reckless
operation of an aircraft.8 5 If a complainant is able to present
admissible evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment that
the alleged negligence violates the federal standard, then she is
in court with her case.8 6 As the cases have shown, however, the
federal standard is a high bar, and preemption is the usual re-
sult. See, for example, Margolies-Mezvinsky v. US Air Corp.8 7 (no
admissible evidence presented to show violation of the FAA stan-
dard in turbulence encounter or the other-passenger falling ob-
ject charge); Allen v. American Airlines, Inc."" (no evidence
presented to show violation of the FAA standard in an OHB
other-passenger incident); and Bomanski v. US Airways Group,
Inc.s9 (case facts do not meet federal standard in OHB "other-
passenger" incident).
81 Id. at 405.
82 Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 654 (2004).
83 See Smith v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 09-02903 WHA, 2009 WL 3072449, at
*5-6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2009).
84 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, and accompanying text concerning
Montreal strict liability.
85 See 14 C.F.R. 91.13 (2015); see also supra note 28 and accompanying text for
an introduction to the Federal Aviation Regulation's "careless and reckless" rule.
86 See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999); see also supra
Part III for discussion of the Abdullah decision and federal preemption of state-
based claims for injury aboard an airliner.
87 No. Civ. A. 98-1526, 2000 WL 122355, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 2000).
88 301 F. Supp. 2d 370, 381 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2003).
89 620 F. Supp. 2d, 2000 WL 122355 (E.D. Pa. June. 4, 2000).
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It would thus appear that the other-passenger OHB incident
charging violation of the federal rule is bound for preemption.
Therefore, if research confirms no palpable crew negligence in
the other-passenger, Act of God, or no crewmember involve-
ment case, claims are safely denied-with FAA preemption
forming the ultimate legal bulwark in the event of a lawsuit.
XI. EJECTMENT AND FAILURE TO CARRY CLAIMS
Ejectment and failure to carry claims-a notorious class due
to adverse publicity attaching to allegations of tortious profil-
ing-divide themselves into two main types: (1) cases with prov-
able actual airline employee animus or illegal conduct giving
rise to probable liability; and (2) claims subject to the specific
FAA safety provision where a passenger's continued presence
was deemed by crewmembers, in the words of the statute, "inimi-
cal to safety."9 The right, indeed the obligation, of a carrier to
exclude a passenger deemed a hazard to safety-long recog-
nized in the common law-is codified in this statute.9" A pro-
genitor case establishing the principle that ejectment of a
schizophrenic exhibiting symptoms was not arbitrary or capri-
cious is Williams v. Trans World Airlines.9 2 More recent cases in-
clude Rubin v. United Air Lines, Inc.9" (passenger made a fuss
about not getting first class and could not be controlled); Chris-
tel v. AMR Corp.94 (captain was entitled to rely on flight attend-
ant representations to eject plaintiff even though a case of flight
attendant misconduct was proved); and Cerqueira v. American Air-
lines, Inc." (racial discrimination complaint trumped by safety).
Conversely, if investigation shows that employee conduct was
facially illegal or with no reasonable connection to enforcement
of an airline policy concerning a "price" or "service," prudence
dictates settling rather than engaging in court tests.96 These erst-
while preemption cases make up a cautionary tale for airlines:
Delta Airlines v. Cook97 (airline's failure to remove a suspicious
90 Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2013).
91 Id.
92 509 F.2d 942, 949 (2d Cir. 1975).
93 96 Cal. App. 4th 364, 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
94 222 F. Supp. 2d 335, 340-41 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2002).
95 520 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2008).
96 See Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 et seq.
(1978) and discussion supra Part VIII of the ADA's insulation of an airline's price
and service policies from state tort suits. Where such policies are not implicated
by the facts of a case, the ADA can be assumed not to apply.
97 816 N.E. 2d 448, 454 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
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passenger was preempted by neither ADA nor FAA); and Wil-
liams v. Midwest Airlines, Inc." (neither contract nor racial dis-
crimination claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation
Act).
XII. CONCLUSION
Traditional negligence principles can handily determine
many, if not most, airline injury claims, with little or no loss in
efficiency. However, the application of specialized aviation and
airline precepts, as discussed here, to the investigation and anal-
ysis can leaven results to make available savings previously for-
gone. The power of an expert-informed explanation of denial-
whether couched in terms of simple physics, physiology, or air-
craft design and operating limitations-to garner claimant as-
sent cannot be overestimated. Where assent is not forthcoming,
ensuing lawsuits have been shown to be subject, with few excep-
tions, to a stolid and robust preemption defense (which legally
replicates the conclusive effect of a denial). Cases failing pre-
emption will, on the other hand, rise or fall on the merits,
which, except in close cases, should vindicate a properly
founded denial. In contrast, where the risk of jury confusion or
misplaced sympathy is real, a settlement mind-set will acquit it-
self as the better part of valor.
98 321 F. Supp. 2d 993, 996 (E.D. Wis. 2004).
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